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THE LAW OF PEOPLES, DISTRIBUTIVE
JUSTICE, AND MIGRATIONS
Seyla Benhabib*
The purpose of this Essay is a humble one. I examine the absence
of any sustained focus in John Rawls's The Law of Peoples on cross-
border movements, be they for purposes of migration or the search
for refuge and asylum. I use the words "sustained focus" expressly,
for a few remarks on these matters are scattered throughout the text,
but they are marginal afterthoughts and in many cases, simply
footnotes.
I would like to argue that Rawls ignores the movement of peoples
across borders and transnational justice concerns which such
movements give rise to, because of his faulty analysis of "peoples."
Rawls's concept of peoples can be salvaged neither empirically nor
normatively. It is empirically inadequate because it is based on poor
social science; it is normatively unacceptable because it contradicts
other fundamental assumptions of Rawlsian political liberalism, such
as the value of individual autonomy. Put sharply, Rawls's Law of
Peoples betrays the Kantian heritage of liberal cosmopolitanism and
courts liberal nationalism.
After a close reading of The Law of Peoples in Parts I and II, I turn
to global justice theorists. Global justice theorists, notably, Thomas
Pogge and Charles Beitz, have gone much further than Rawls in
pleading for justice across borders, but they have subsumed migratory
movements under global distributive justice. I maintain that the
difference principle is not adequate to help us think through
transnational justice issues and that principles of "just membership"
are equally central to cosmopolitan justice.
What would be the contours of cosmopolitan right in the Kantian
tradition, I ask, if we proceed from the view that migratory
movements have been ubiquitous throughout human history, and that
the actions of sovereign states in an interdependent world constitute
"pull" as well as "push" factors in migration? My answer is that the
right to membership ought to be considered a human right, in the
moral sense of the term, and that it should be respected as a legal right
* Eugene Meyer Professor of Political Science and Philosophy, Yale University;
Director, Program in Ethics, Politics and Economics. I wish to thank Melvin Rogers
for his assistance.
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as well by being incorporated into states' constitutions through just
citizenship and naturalization provisions.
I. RAWLSIAN PEOPLES
Political membership has rarely been considered an important
aspect of theories of domestic and international justice. John Rawls's
political philosophy is no exception. By political membership, I mean
the principles and practices for incorporating aliens and strangers,
immigrants and newcomers, refugees and asylum seekers into existing
polities. Political boundaries define some as members, others as
aliens. Membership, in turn, is only meaningful when accompanied by
rituals of entry, access, belonging and privilege. The modern nation-
state system has regulated membership in terms of one principal
category, namely, national citizenship. Rawls not only takes the
institution of national citizenship as an analytical given without
interrogating it further, but more significantly, he proceeds from a
methodological standpoint which renders the question of political
membership simply invisible.
In Political Liberalism, Rawls writes:
[A] democratic society, like any political society, is to be viewed as a
complete and closed social system. It is complete in that it is self-
sufficient and has a place for all the main purposes of human life. It
is also closed ... in that entry into it is only by birth and exit from it
is only by death.... Thus, we are not seen as joining society at the
age of reason, as we might join an association, but as being born into
a society where we will lead a complete life.1
Surely, Rawls meant to use the model of a closed society as a
counterfactual fiction, as a convenient thought-experiment in
reasoning about justice; yet by not granting conditions of entry and
exit into the political community a central role in a liberal-democratic
theory of justice, he assumed that the state-centric model of
territorially delimited nations, with fairly closed and well-guarded
borders, would continue to govern our thinking in these matters.
Rawls's reasons for choosing a state-centric perspective in reasoning
about international justice was made amply clear in The Law of
Peoples:
An important role of a people's government, however arbitrary a
society's boundaries may appear from a historical point of view, is to
be the representative and effective agent of a people as they take
responsibility for their territory and its environmental integrity, as
well as for the size of their population. 2
Rawls adds in the footnote to this passage that "a people has at least a
1. John Rawls, Political Liberalism 40-41 (1996) (emphasis added).
2. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples 38-39 (1999).
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qualified right to limit immigration. I leave aside here what these
qualifications might be."3
In choosing bounded political communities, and in particular the
modern nation-state, as the relevant unit for developing a conception
of domestic and international justice, Rawls was departing
significantly from Immanuel Kant and his teaching of cosmopolitan
law. If Kant's major advance was to articulate relations of justice
which were valid for all individuals considered as moral persons in the
international arena, independently of their political membership, in
Rawls's The Law of Peoples individuals are not the principal agents of
justice but are instead submerged into unities which Rawls names
"peoples." For Kant, the essence of ius cosmopoliticum was the thesis
that all moral persons were members of a world-society in which they
could potentially interact with one another. Rawls, by contrast, sees
individuals as members of peoples and not as cosmopolitan citizens.
There has been considerable debate in the literature as to why
Rawls would choose to develop a view of international justice from
the standpoint of peoples.4 This methodological beginning leads him
to articulate principles of international justice not for individuals,
considered as units of equal moral respect and concern in a world
society, but for peoples and their representatives. But the cogency of
Rawls's definition of peoples is doubtful. An examination of Rawls's
assumptions concerning peoples will also help clarify why for him
bounded communities are the privileged units of an ideal theory of
global justice, whereas migratory movements, which challenge this
bounded vision, become matters for non-ideal theory.
The concept of peoples is introduced by Rawls as a device of
representation, much as the conception of moral individuals was in A
Theory of Justice' and that of the citizen was in Political Liberalism.6
A device of representation accentuates certain features of the object
to be represented while bracketing or minimizing others. So it is too
with the concept of peoples. Rawlsian peoples are ideally defined as
"liberal peoples" and have three basic features: "a reasonably just
constitutional democratic government that serves their fundamental
interests; citizens united by what Mill called 'common sympathies';
and finally, a moral nature."7 A major concern of the Rawlsian view
of justice becomes how or why a Law of Peoples chosen by the
representatives of liberal peoples would be acceptable to non-liberal
3. Id. at 39 n.48.
4. Charles Beitz, Rawls's Law of Peoples, 110 Ethics 669-96 (2000); Thomas W.
Pogge, Moral Universalism and Global Economic Justice, 1 Pol. Phil. & Econ. 29-58
(2002); Allan Buchanan, Rawls's Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian
World, 110 Ethics 697-721 (2000).
5. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971).
6. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1.
7. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 2, at 23.
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peoples as well. Hence, the Law of Peoples is developed in two steps,
first from the perspective of liberal societies and subsequently from
the standpoint of "decent nonliberal peoples."8
More significant though is the admixture of sociological and ethical
properties that Rawls attributes to peoples. Rawls's category bundles
together empirical as well as normative features. While most social
scientists and historians would agree that some modicum of "common
sympathies"9 may be necessary to distinguish one people or nation
from another, it is odd to stipulate that peoples would not be such
unless they were governed by "a just constitutional democratic
government."1 The difficulty arises from Rawls's stringing together
normative stipulations with sociological characteristics. This method
of idealization makes it difficult to understand whether he intends his
concept of peoples to be historically and sociologically cogent or
merely normatively acceptable from the standpoint of his principles of
justice. Clearly, he intends it to be both but conflating these two
perspectives right at the outset creates problems that reverberate
throughout the subsequent argument.
Since he wishes to avoid the pitfalls of realist international theory
which takes states and their interests as the principal actors in the
international arena, Rawls wishes to distinguish states from peoples.
He argues that peoples, not states, are the relevant moral and
sociological actors in reasoning about justice on a global scale. Yet he
fails to convince that analytically a viable distinction between peoples
and states can be made on his own terms. For what political form
besides that of a sovereign modern state could "a just constitutional
democratic government" possess? 1 Could this be an empire? Or a
city-state? Rawls does not provide us with clear differentiations
between state-forms and forms of government. Even if we sympathize
with Rawls's critique of realist international theory and standard
models of sovereignty, as I do, analytically more careful distinctions
need to be drawn right at the outset of a theory of the law of peoples
between states, peoples and government forms.
Rawls insists that peoples are not states in the first place because he
does not wish to ascribe them sovereignty. Two of the most
8. Id. at 5; cf. Beitz, supra note 4, at 675.
9. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 2, at 23.
10. Id.; cf Robert H. Wiebe, Who We Are: A History of Popular Nationalism 5
(2002) ("Nationalism is the desire among people who believe they share a common
ancestry and a common destiny to live under their own government on land sacred to
their history. Nationalism expresses an aspiration with a political objective." (emphasis
added)). Note how Wiebe's definition finesses the question of whether people
actually share a common ancestry or destiny; that they believe that they do is what is
important for nationalist movements. But the social scientists need not share this
belief although he reckons with it as a crucial factor in understanding nationalism.
Such duality of perspectives, as between social actors and social observers and
scientists, is absent from Rawls's definition of peoplehood altogether.
11. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 2, at 23.
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commonly associated features of sovereignty, namely internal
sovereignty over a population and external sovereignty to declare war
against other sovereign units, will be derived from the law of peoples
in Rawls's scheme and hence cannot be viewed as prerogatives which
parties to the contract of the law of peoples already possess. Both
internal sovereignty and external sovereignty will depend for their
legitimacy on the law of peoples. This is a commendable aspect of
Rawls's argument: He makes the legitimacy of sovereignty
conditional upon a state's recognition of certain principles of justice,
among them respect for human rights and a determination not to
instigate war for reasons other than self-defense. 2 While we can
follow Rawls's wish to impose moral constraints on traditional
conceptions of state sovereignty, it is incoherent to envisage a people
as having a constitutional government without also possessing some
form of territorial sovereignty. 3 This then creates a dilemma for
Rawls's theory: Either he must assume that peoples who are united
by "common sympathies," and "ruled by a just constitutional
government,"14 are territorially organized semi-sovereign units, which
possess features very much like states, or he must give up the
stipulation that peoples are already organized into certain forms of
government. If he were to accept the latter option, Rawls may need
to revert to viewing individuals rather than organized peoples as the
privileged units of reasoning about international justice.
Peoples cannot have the following normative features which Rawls
wants to ascribe to them and not be considered as territorially
circumscribed and self-governing modern states. Among the eight
normative conditions which Rawls lists to characterize a people, the
obligations "to observe treaties and undertakings;" to not "instigate
war for reasons other than self-defense;" to "honor human rights,"
while unobjectionable from a moral point of view, are hardly
conceivable without a modern state apparatus with standing armies, a
fully developed judicial and administrative bureaucracy and other
representative institutions. 15 Once more, the distinction between
peoples with representative governments and modern states
disappears.
12. Id. at 37-38.
13. Cf. Andrew Kuper, Rawlsian Global Justice: Beyond The Law of Peoples to a
Cosmopolitan Law of Persons, 28 Pol. Theory 640, 644 (2000).
The difference is that in Realist theory, the shell of state sovereignty may
not be pierced or removed if and when a regime acts unjustly or
unreasonably-this exemplifies what I shall call "thick statism"-whereas in
Rawls's theory, the law of peoples reasonably constrains what a state may
rightly do to its own people and other states; this exemplifies what I shall call
"thin statism."
Id.
14. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 2, at 23.
15. Id. at 37.
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In his defense of Rawls, Stephen Macedo has argued:
The moral significance of states or peoples is not really so
mysterious, but let us remind ourselves what a people has done in
assuming the powers of self-government. They form a union usually
understood as perpetual, and assert permanent control over a given
territory, perhaps as the result of a violent struggle for
independence.
16
Macedo clearly uses the terms peoples and states interchangeably.
In doing so, he departs from the manner in which Rawls wishes to
construct the steps in his theory. For Rawls, sovereign statehood must
succeed peoplehood and the choice of the Law of Peoples and not
precede them. But analytically the choice of "just constitutional
government"' 7 and its form of statehood would need to occur through
the same step. Thus Rawls could develop a concept of peoples as a
distinctive human collectivity persisting through time, but if he wishes
to propose that such a collectivity is also to be thought of as governed
by a just constitutional power, then indeed not merely peoples but
peoples as organized into sovereign states are his units of analysis.
In addition to being united by common sympathies and ruled by a
just, constitutional government, according to Rawls, each people
should possess "a moral nature."18  Rawls proceeds here from a
holistic understanding of peoples, each of whom is defined by clearly
delineable boundaries and a set of clearly identifiable values and
mores. In this holistic vision, peoples are viewed as carriers of a
coherent moral world-view, whose contours can be identified by the
social theorist, as well as being identifiable to the social agents
themselves. This holistic conception of peoplehood belongs to the
infancy of the social sciences.
Missing from this vision is an appreciation of the significant internal
division of human societies along the lines of class, gender, ethnicity,
religion, language, etc. Instead, the aspirations of liberal nationalist
movements in their period of ascendancy in the second half of the
nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries are taken as
paradigmatic, and they are presented, not as ideals, but as social facts.
Peoples are not found; they develop through history. A crucial way in
which peoples who are riven by class, gender, ethnicity and religion
develop is precisely through contestation around the terms and
meaning of their common "moral nature." Excluded and
marginalized groups, such as workers and women in the early
bourgeois republics, sought to transform the moral code of the nation
to make it more inclusive, less focused on property hierarchies and
16. Stephen Macedo, What Self-Governing Peoples Owe to One Another:
Universalism, Diversity, and The Law of Peoples, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1721, 1730
(2004) (emphasis added).
17. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 2, at 23.
18. Id.
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distinctions, and more attuned to the achievements of female
citizenship. Similar struggles were repeated by excluded and
marginalized racial, ethnic and religious groups. To view peoples as
homogeneous entities characterized by a clearly identifiable "moral
nature" and a source of "common sympathies"" is not only
sociologically wrong: it is inimical to the interests of those who have
been excluded because they have refused to accept or respect their
people's hegemonic moral code. Rawls's vision of peoplehood slides
over into nationalism. In the final analysis, his liberal nationalist
vision is more nationalist than liberal, precisely because instead of
treating the hegemonic aspirations of nationalist movements to forge
a people united by common sympathies and a shared moral nature as
ideological struggles, he confers upon them the status of sociological
facts.
Suppose one defends Rawls's definition along the lines suggested by
Charles Beitz:
The idea of a people is part of an ideal conception of the world.
Rawls need not maintain that many (or even any) actual states fully
satisfy the criteria for being a people in order to maintain that it
would be desirable to move in the direction of the ideal. The
appropriate question about the idea of a people is whether it
represents a sufficiently desirable form of human social organization
to serve as the basic constituent element of a world society, not
whether it serves as a realistic proxy for any actually existing states.20
Beitz's defense suggests that we should judge Rawls's conception of
a people normatively, in the light of ideal theory, and not in terms of
its sociological adequacy. I would contend that, from the standpoint
of ideal theory as well, it is undesirable to view the "Society of
Peoples, 21 as a world-community composed of such highly integrated,
homogeneous and homogenizing collectivities. The losers in this
nationalist romance will be precisely those liberal and democratic
norms and values which Rawls also wants to characterize peoples.
Why? Because there is always and necessarily a contention, a
disunity, a healthy disjunction between the universalizing values,
norms and principles of just constitutional government and the
particularistic "common sympathies" and "moral nature" of a specific
people with a unique history and memory. Rawls minimizes the
context-transcendent aspect of liberal-democratic values and norms
that are otherwise so central to his own vision of justice and political
liberalism. "We, the people" is a tension-riven formula, which seeks
to contain the universalizing aspirations of rights claims and
democratic struggles within the confines of a historically situated
19. Id.
20. Beitz, supra note 4, at 680.
21. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 2, at 3.
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collectivity. Such a collectivity has its "others" within and without.
Peoplehood is an aspiration; it is not a fact.
I am not seeking to make a skeptical postmodernist claim about the
instability of identity-categories. Rather, I am emphasizing that,
particularly for peoples who are governed by liberal-democratic
institutions, there cannot be, nor is it desirable that there ought to be,
an uncontested collective narrative of common sympathies and of a
unique moral nature. Collective identities are formed by strands of
competing and contentious narratives, through which universalizing
aspirations and particular memories compete with one another to
create temporary narrative syntheses, which are then challenged and
riven by new divisions and debates. Narratives of peoplehood, and in
particular of liberal-democratic peoplehood, evolve historically
through such contentions and disputations.22
Rawls's view of peoples is neither ethically nor sociologically
defensible. Even if we grant Rawls the legitimacy of idealizations,
these idealizations are not neutral steps toward a normative argument,
but have normative consequences themselves. Allan Buchanan names
a further consequence of Rawls's view:
Rawls assumes that, for purposes of a moral theory of international
relations, the standard case is that of a state whose population is
unified by a shared political culture, a common conception of public
order-in other words, a state within which there are no conflicts
over fundamental issues of justice or the good and no divisions over
which groups are entitled to their own states or to special group
rights. 3
22. Rogers M. Smith, Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political
Membership (2003). I have presented in more detail my conception of the narrative
constitution of identities in Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture: Equality and
Diversity in the Global Era 6 (2002). I am assuming that identities are demarcated
through contested narratives for two reasons: human actions and relations are
formed through a double hermeneutic. We identify what we do through an account of
what we do; words and deeds are equally primordial, in the sense that almost all
socially significant human actions are identified as a certain type of doing through the
accounts that agents and others give of that doing. Second, not only are human
actions and interactions constituted through a "web of narratives," but they are also
constituted through the actors' evaluative stances toward their doings. Id. at 7. These
are second-order narratives that entail a normative attitude toward first-order ones.
Rawls could object by claiming that the use of complicated philosophical
premises and sociological theories is illicit in reasoning about justice, since we have to
confine ourselves to such premises as can be shared by "public culture." I have
always found this a particularly stifling aspect of Rawlsian theory, which is inimical to
the enlightenment function of much theory and philosophy. Even leaving this matter
aside, however, I would argue that Rawls relies on social science throughout his work
and in The Law of Peoples as well, so that the question is not whether one utilizes
assumptions and facts from sociology, history and economics but which kinds of facts
and theories are used. Rawls sidesteps debates among "constructivists" and
"essentialists" in studies of nationalism and presents essentialism as if it were an
uncontested position. See id. at 5-22, 187-89.
23. Buchanan, supra note 4, at 717.
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Such a vision of "deep political unity" ignores intrastate conflict; it
neglects the claims and grievances of groups who find neither voice
nor representation for their cultures and ways of life within the
confines of such a political culture. Consequently, minority group
rights, or the cultural citizenship rights of peoples who are not
organized as states themselves, but who are members of larger
sovereign states-such as the Aborigines in Australia, First Nations in
Canada, Native Americans in the USA, and the Indios in Latin
America-disappear from the landscape of the Rawlsian peoples.24
Let me return to Rawls's claim:
[A] democratic society, like any political society, is to be viewed as a
complete and closed social system. It is complete in that it is self-
sufficient and has a place for all the main purposes of human life. It
is also closed.., in that entry into it is only by birth and exit from it
is only by death.... Thus, we are not seen as joining society at the
age of reason, as we might join an association, but as being born into
a society where we will lead a complete life.25
In view of the preceding discussion, Rawls's point of view is more
intelligible, although much less defensible. Precisely because he views
peoples as constituting discrete entities unified by a common moral
nature, a democratic people for Rawls comes to resemble a moral
cosmos; in fact, it is a moral cosmos. The assumption that we enter
society by birth and that we must be viewed as "leading a complete
life, 26 within it, which we exit only in death, is so wildly off the mark
historically, that its use by Rawls can only be understood in the light
of broader presuppositions concerning peoplehood and nations.
The tension between the universalistic premises of Rawls's political
liberalism and the more particularistic orientations of his Law of
Peoples come fully to light around this matter. To view political
society as a "complete and closed27 social system,, 28 is not compatible
with other premises of Rawlsian liberalism. Rawls understands
persons to be endowed with two moral powers: a capacity to
formulate and pursue an independent conception of the good, and a
capacity for a sense of justice and to engage in mutual cooperative
ventures with others. Each of these capacities could potentially bring
the individual into conflict with the vision of a democratic society as a
"closed and complete system." Individuals may feel that their
understanding of the good, be it for moral, political, religious, artistic
24. See Benhabib, supra note 22, at 122-46 (discussing cultural groups' rights).
25. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 40-41 (emphasis added).
26. Id.
27. It is unclear how Rawls intends us to understand the term "closed." Does he
mean that such societies do not permit emigration or immigration? Then they would
not be liberal societies but authoritarian regimes. Countries behind the Iron Curtain
were "closed" in that they prohibited emigration and closely regulated internal
migration. But cf. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 2, at 74 n.15.
28. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 41.
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or scientific reasons, obliges them to leave the society into which they
were born and to join another society. This implies then that
individuals, in pursuit of their sense of the good, ought to have a right
to leave their societies. Emigration must be a fundamental liberty in a
Rawlsian scheme, for otherwise his conception of the person becomes
incoherent. The language of a "closed and complete society" is
incompatible with the liberal vision of persons and their liberties.
If it is the case then that some individuals' conceptions of the good
may induce them to leave their countries of citizenship, we also have
to assume that there may be "common sympathies" and "communities
of shared moral sense" which may not overlap with the boundaries of
peoplehood. We speak of "a republic of letters"; of "workers of the
world"; of "international and transnational women's groups." One of
the oldest international institutions in Western societies is the
Catholic Church itself. One's sense of the moral good may or may not
overlap with the boundaries of one's people. It is most likely that
individuals in liberal-democratic cultures will be creatures with
multiple, and often conflicting, visions of the good; they will have
overlapping attachments to partial communities; in short they will be
caught in circles of overlapping and intersecting sympathy and
identification.
A crucial consequence of these reflections is that Rawls's own
commitment to legitimate moral and political pluralism is jeopardized
by his vision of closed societies. While he is ready to recognize
intragroup pluralism across the boundaries of peoples and to accept
that there will be "decent hierarchical peoples," whose lives and
values will be different than those who live in secular, liberal Western
democracies, it is odd that Rawls does not acknowledge intergroup
pluralism. Within Western democratic societies as well there are
many groups and individuals who bear affinity with, and share the
value systems of, decent hierarchical peoples. Put sharply, observant
Muslims and observant Jews are not "elsewhere"; they are our
neighbors, citizens, and ourselves in liberal-democratic societies.
Value pluralism at the intragroup level is parallel to value pluralism at
the intergroup level. "The other" is not elsewhere.
The concept of a closed and complete democratic society is no more
plausible than Rawls's conception of peoplehood and for much the
same reason. In each case, Rawls subordinates his understanding of
moral personhood to the fiction of peoplehood. There is an
irresolvable tension in his formulations between the ideals of
autonomous personality, even in its watered-down weak Kantian
versions, and that of a closed and complete society. His own
understanding of the person ought to have led him to view societies as
much more interactive, overlapping, and fluid entities, whose
boundaries are permeable and porous, whose moral visions are
1770 [Vol. 72
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE & MIGRATIONS
exchanged, transported across borders, assimilated into other
contexts, and re-exported back into the home country.
II. MIGRATIONS IN THE IA W OF PEOPLES
It should thus come as no surprise that migrations would not be
considered as an aspect of The Law of Peoples and its regulation
would not be a topic of ideal theory. For Rawls, migratory
movements are episodic and not essential to the life of peoples;
conditions of entry and exit into liberal-democratic societies are
peripheral for evaluating the nature of these societies. Nevertheless,
Rawls does not completely relegate migrations to non-ideal theory,
that is, to the discretion of practices which would be neutral from a
moral point of view, he does name several conditions which he views
as morally legitimate in limiting immigration.
The first argument is a version of "the tragedy of the commons."
Unless a definite agent is given responsibility for maintaining an asset
and bears losses for not doing so, Rawls reasons, a people's territory
cannot be preserved in perpetuity for others.29 This argument then
leads to the conclusion that there must be boundaries of some kind.
Notice here that Rawls is arguing against radically open borders. But
since he does not weigh the "tragedy of the commons" line of
reasoning against evidence of benefits-economic and otherwise-to
be derived from open borders, the reader has to accept on a common-
sense basis that yes, indeed, borders of some kind may be necessary.
There is sufficient empirical evidence, however, that open and fairly
porous borders which enable the free movement of peoples, goods
and services across state boundaries are highly beneficial to the
functioning of free market economies. Important empirical evidence
drawn from the economics of migration could offset Rawls's exclusive
reliance upon the "tragedy of the commons" perspective."
Rawls's second reason for limiting immigration "is to protect a
people's political culture and its constitutional principles."31  Why
does Rawls assume that immigration would threaten political culture
29. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 2, at 39.
30. The Economist, A Modest Contribution, in Special Supplement, A Survey of
Immigration 12-13 (November 2, 2002).
At a given moment, migrants are generally net contributors to the public
purse: they are disproportionately of working age, and the receiving country
has not had to pay for their education, A study by Britain's Home Office
estimated that the foreign-born population paid about 10% more to the
government than it received in expenditure. However, a magisterial study in
1997 of the economic impacts of immigration, by America's National
Research Council, found that the picture changes if one looks across time
instead of taking a snapshot. In that case, the NRC found, first-generation
immigrants imposed an average net fiscal cost of $3,000 at present
discounted value; but the second generation yielded a $80,000 fiscal gain.
Id.
31. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 2, at 39 n.48.
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and constitutional principles, unless he takes it for granted that
immigrants are somehow alien and unruly elements, unlikely to be
integrated or educated in the ways of the host country? Why does
Rawls conceive of the immigrant as a threat? What historical or
social-scientific basis is there for the claim that immigrants have
destroyed a country's political culture rather than transforming it, that
they have not defended, enriched, as well as challenged constitutional
principles?
Consider some contemporary cases: Certainly, the predicament of
the Palestinian refugees after 1948 and in the succeeding decades in
Lebanon added to that country's destabilization and eventually
resulted in the civil war of the 1980s. In Afghanistan, the Muslim
"mujahadeen" (freedom fighters) of the Northern Alliance and the
more Islamist Taliban, who had been principally organized among the
Afghan refugees in Pakistan, fought together to end the Soviet
invasion. The return of these Afghan refugees to their country
eventually tipped the balance in favor of the Taliban regime which
then provided Al-Qaeda with a free operating ground. But these
cases can be hardly considered examples of regularized migration
flows or even of typical refugee and asylum resettlements. These
developments are tied in with profound local dynamics, such as the
already existing conflict in Lebanon among Muslim and Christian
Arabs, and the radical divergence in Afghanistan among secular and
religious contra-Soviet fighters. In these instances, migratory
movements indeed acted as catalysts to the unraveling of already
existing local tensions.
More commonly though, rather than damaging a people's political
culture and its constitution, migrants revitalize it and deepen it. Such
was the contribution of exiled liberals and socialists to the political
cultures of nineteenth-century Paris and London; certainly American
political culture in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is
unthinkable without the contributions of immigrant Irish, Italian,
Jewish, Polish and other communities. Nor is it conceivable to think
of the American university in the post-World War II period without
taking into account the contributions of the many exiled European
scholars. Migratory movements alone, and without crucial
dislocations and tensions already at work in the receiving societies
themselves, do not threaten a people's political culture and its
constitutional principles.
Finally, Rawls does acknowledge a "duty to assist burdened
societies,"3 and suggests that liberal peoples can acquit themselves of
the moral obligations they owe to other less fortunate societies
through economic aid and assistance.3 I shall discuss at more length
32. Id. at 106.
33. Id. at 106-07.
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why this natural duty of assistance needs to be distinguished carefully
from a global redistributive principle. The natural duty of assistance
has implications for migration rights, in that such assistance to
economically poor and disadvantaged societies is expected to reduce
the pressure of migratory movements on richer societies. In a world
of great economic disparities, in which the pull of higher standards of
living in wealthier countries is an undeniable cause of migrations, such
assistance could certainly help ease pressure in some regions of the
world for certain periods of time.34 Rawls's perspective would thus
justify that nations who engage in foreign aid to those countries or
regions of the world which are senders, could impose a harsher regime
of migration, such as to minimize entry into their societies. Moral
balancing acts as between duties of assistance to others and the
legitimate self-interest of states are endemic to migration debates and
policies; they are indeed part of the arsenal of realist politics in this
domain. Yet it is necessary to formulate some clearer criteria of what
would be acceptable or unacceptable migration policies on the part of
liberal democratic states. As commonsensical as such balancing acts
may appear, they need to be refined and redefined through careful
distinctions as between the moral claims of migrants on the one hand
and those of refugees and asylum seekers on the other. For toward
the latter, states which are signatories to various international
conventions, bear not only moral but also legal obligations. These
distinctions, which were so crucial to the cosmopolitan considerations
of Kant, find no place in Rawls's scheme. I do not believe that this
omission is a matter of oversight alone but that rather it is a
consequence of Rawls's ideal theory of peoples in the world
community.
In the final analysis Rawls's realist utopia aims at a radical solution
to world migratory movements. In a society of liberal and decent
peoples there would be no persecution of religious and ethnic
minorities, no political oppression, no population pressure, no
inequality between men and women, and economic inequalities would
diminish. Thus, "[t]he problem of immigration is not, then, simply left
aside, but is eliminated as a serious problem in a realistic utopia."3 In
Rawls's ideal utopia, peoples become windowless monads who have
no interest in mixing, mingling and interacting with others. This is
certainly a vision of an ordered world, but it is also the vision of a
static, dull world of self-satisfied peoples, who are indifferent not only
to each others' plight but to each others' charms as well.
In conclusion: The Rawlsian Law of Peoples does not continue
upon the terrain charted by Kant's doctrine of cosmopolitan right in
that Rawls does not consider individuals to be the moral and political
34. See The Economist, supra note 30.
35. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 2, at 9.
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agents of a world-society, but rather chooses peoples to be the
principal actors in this arena. Notwithstanding disclaimers to the
contrary, Rawls cannot distinguish analytically between peoples and
states with the consequence that cosmopolitan right is sacrificed on
the altar of states' security and self-interest.
Rawls is admirably clear on where he departs from views of
cosmopolitan justice. He writes:
Some think that any liberal Law of Peoples... should begin by first
taking up the question of liberal cosmopolitan or global justice for
all persons. They argue that in such a view all persons are
considered to be reasonable and rational and to possess what I have
called 'the two moral powers'.... Following the kind of reasoning
familiar in the original position for the domestic case, the parties
would then adopt a first principle that all persons have equal basic
rights and liberties. Proceeding this way would straightaway ground
human rights in a political (moral) conception of liberal
cosmopolitan justice.36
Rawls believes that it is implausible to proceed in this way, for this
procedure would impose a metaphysical or comprehensive view of
liberalism upon all peoples. He rejects this philosophically, but he
also seems concerned that such a view would necessarily lead to an
expansionist, intolerant and possibly belligerent foreign policy on the
part of liberal peoples. 3
7
I have argued that Rawls's commitment to legitimate moral and
political pluralism is compromised by his vision of democratic peoples
as living in closed societies. A more radical pluralism would lead to
the acknowledgment of the multiple and dynamic ties, interactions
and crisscrossing of peoples. As opposed to the vision of a "closed"
society into which individuals are born and which they leave only in
death, I shall proceed from the assumption that liberal peoples ought
to have fairly open borders. Such societies not only permit a
fundamental right to emigrate, but they coexist within a system of
mutual obligations and privileges, an essential component of which is
the privilege to immigrate, that is, to enter another peoples' territory
and become a member of its society peacefully. Peoples are radically
and not merely episodically interdependent. Nation-states develop in
history as units of a system of states. They emerge out of the ruins of
old multinational empires. Many nation-states emerged in Europe
and the Middle East after the collapse of the Austria-Hungarian, the
Russian, and the Ottoman Empires at the end of World War I. The
decolonization struggles against the British, French, Portuguese and
Dutch empires in the aftermath of World War II resulted in new
states being born in Asia, Africa and elsewhere. Beginning with the
36. Id. at 82.
37. Id. at 82-83.
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nineteenth century, Latin American nations struggled against the
Spanish empire. I view peoples and states therefore as actors
developing in the context of a world-society. The nation-state, which
combines territorial sovereignty with aspirations to cultural
homogeneity and democratic constitutional government, is a unique
product of world-society as it undergoes political modernization.
III. TOWARD A RADICALIZED RAWLSIANISM
A. Moral Cosmopolitanism
It should come as no surprise that for many students of Rawls, his
views on cosmopolitan justice have proven a source of
disappointment. Radicalizing Rawls's intentions against Rawls
himself, Joseph Carens has drawn completely different conclusions
from Rawlsian premises. In an early article, Joseph Carens used the
device of the Rawlsian "veil of ignorance," and against the intentions
of Rawls himself, to think through principles of justice from the
standpoint of the refugee, the immigrant, and the asylum seeker.38
Are the borders within which we happen to be born, and the
documents to which we are entitled, any less arbitrary from a moral
point of view than other characteristics such as skin color, gender, and
genetic make-up with which we are endowed? Carens's answer is
"no." From a moral point of view, the borders which circumscribe our
birth and the papers to which we are entitled are arbitrary, since their
distribution among individuals does not follow any clear criteria of
moral achievement and moral compensation. Citizenship status and
privileges, which are simply based upon territorially defined birth-
right, are no less arbitrary than one's skin color and other genetic
endowments. Therefore, claims Carens, liberal democracies should
practice policies which are as compatible as possible with the vision of
a world without borders.
B. Legal Cosmopolitanism
In recognition of the difficulties of translating such universal moral
obligations into viable political forms at the global level, Thomas
Pogge has distinguished between "moral cosmopolitanism," which
asserts that "every human being has a global stature as an ultimate
unit of moral concern" and "legal cosmopolitanism."39  Legal
cosmopolitanism "is committed," in Pogge's words, "to a concrete
political ideal of a global order under which all persons have
equivalent legal rights and duties, that is, are fellow citizens of a
38. Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, in
Theorizing Citizenship 229 (Ronald Beiner ed., 1995).
39. Thomas W. Pogge, Cosmopolitanism & Sovereignty, 103 Ethics 48, 49 (1992).
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universal republic."4 Pogge wants to defend a set of institutionalized
global ground rules, which, while falling short of a world-state, will
nonetheless move the global status quo toward a more cosmopolitan
world order in the legal sense.
Pogge's formulations remind us of a difficulty which Kant had also
confronted, namely, whether moral cosmopolitanism would inevitably
result in a "universal monarchy," i.e., a world government. Kant
argued that such a world government would be a "soulless
despotism."41  While rejecting the idea of a world state, Kant
embraced the idea of a society of peoples, each of whom would be
governed by a set of similar republican principles, but which,
nonetheless, would permit some variation. Is legal cosmopolitanism
compatible with republican or democratic freedom? What variation
in legal institutions and the schedule of human rights is permissible
within a legal cosmopolitan framework?
A clear implication of any moral and legal cosmopolitan position is
that existing disparities in the living standards and life expectations of
the world's peoples ought to be subject to critique and reform. As
was the case for Kant, so too for Pogge and Beitz, it is individuals who
are the units of moral and legal rights in a world society and not
peoples. People's interactions are continuous and not episodic; their
lives and livelihoods are radically, and not only intermittently
interdependent, as they were in the Rawlsian model. While neither
Pogge nor Beitz directly address matters of migration, their positions
have clear implications for migration rights and just membership.
C. The Duty of Assistance Versus Global Distributive Justice
For Rawls, "[w]ell-ordered peoples have a duty to assist burdened
societies."42 Yet, according to Rawls, it is not the case "that the only
way, or the best way, to carry out this duty of assistance is by
following a principle of distributive justice to regulate economic and
social inequalities among societies."43  For many of Rawls's
40. Id. at 49.
41. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, in On History 85, 113 (Lewis White Beck
trans. & ed., 1957) (1795).
42. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 2, at 106. Rawls leaves the sources of
this duty unclear. While the duty to assist others in need is included in most systems
of individual morality, whether Kantian, rule-utilitarian, or intuitionist, it is unclear
what the sources of such obligations among collectivities would be. One possible
answer is that the "Society of Peoples" must be viewed as a system of cooperation in
which each people has a duty to improve the conditions of all others such that some
form of equality among them may be attained. If this is Rawls's reasoning, cf. id. at
18-19, then liberal cosmopolitans such as Beitz and Pogge are justified in asking why a
system of cooperation may not be subjected to even more demanding criteria of
equality among the cooperating parties.
43. Id. at 106.
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sympathizers, this claim has seemed inconsistent at best and
hypocritical at worst. Thomas Pogge sarcastically observes:
As it is, the moral debate is largely focused on the question to what
extent affluent societies and persons have obligations to help others
worse off than themselves. Some deny all such obligations, others
claim them to be quite demanding. Both sides easily take for
granted that it is as potential helpers that we are morally related to
the starving abroad. This is true, of course. But the debate ignores
that we are also and much more significantly related to them as
supporters of, and beneficiaries from, a global institutional order that
substantially contributes to their destitution.44
A similar criticism was expressed by Charles Beitz in Political
Theory and International Relations:
International interdependence involves a complex and substantial
pattern of social interaction, which produces benefits and burdens
that would not exist if national economies were autarkic. In view of
these considerations, Rawls's passing concern for the law of nations
seems to miss the point of international justice altogether. In an
interdependent world, confining principles of social justice to
domestic societies has the effect of taxing poor nations so that others
may benefit from living in "just" regimes.
The disagreement about the scope and content of principles of
distributive justice on the global scale involves methodological as well
as empirical divergences among Rawls and his more radical followers.
Rawls, while not denying that the international system is one of
interdependencies, clearly views this fact to be of secondary
importance in determining a country's wealth or poverty. The causes
of "the wealth of nations" are endogenous and not exogenous. A
country's wealth is determined by "its political culture," by religious,
philosophical and moral traditions that support its basic structure, as
well as by the moral qualities of its people, such as their
industriousness and cooperative talents.46 There is remarkably little
social scientific evidence that Rawls adduces to support this
assertion.47 These assertions rest less on empirical evidence but more
on Rawls's methodological take-off point which views liberal peoples
as living in well-ordered societies, whose good fortune is a
consequence of their own institutions and moral nature. In this
remarkably Victorian account of the wealth of nations, the plunder of
44. Pogge, supra note 4, at 50.
45. Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations 149-50 (1999).
46. See Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 2, at 109.
47. Rawls cites David Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (1998);
Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famine (1981); Amartya Sen and Jean Dreze, Hunger and
Public Action (1989). But Sen's perspective on these matters is much more globalist
and structural, and less culturalist and nation-state centered than Landes's. Rawls
glosses over these differences.
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Africa by all Western societies is not mentioned even once; the global
character of the African slave trade and its contribution to the
accumulation of capitalist wealth in the United States and the
Caribbean Basin is barely recalled; the colonization of the Americas
disappears from view, and it is as if the British never dominated India
and exploited its riches. These historical omissions are of such
magnitude in a work on the law of peoples that we have to ask why
Rawls has imposed blinders which affect his sight of justice so
drastically.
My purpose is not to rehash well-known debates about the origins
of capitalism in the West-the so-called "good fortune" of liberal
peoples-and about the interdependence of capitalism and
imperialism. I take it that it would be historically grossly inadequate
to consider the development of capitalism without also taking into
account the history of Western imperialism.48 It is also not necessary
to render quick judgments on these complex world-historical
processes: Whether early capitalist accumulation in the West would
have been possible without colonial expansion is doubtful, but it is
equally clear, as Max Weber has instructed us, that the moral and
cultural value transformations leading to the formation of the
"Protestant ethic" in the West, had indigenous sources.4 9 These
sources lie in the intellectual and moral dynamic of the scientific and
Protestant revolutions which, although they eventually attained
world-wide significance, originated first in the West alone. The
"wealth of nations" needs to be examined in light of the history of the
world economy; the methodological distortions caused by assumptions
of cultural autarky need to be discarded. I join Beitz when he writes:
It is easier to demonstrate that a pattern of global interdependence
exists, and that it yields substantial aggregate benefits, than to say
with certainty how these benefits are distributed under existing
institutions and practices or what burdens these institutions and
practices impose on participants in the world economy.50
Does global interdependence suggest then that the world economic
system is a "system of cooperation"? A system of cooperation means
that the rules distributing obligations as well as benefits would be
clearly identifiable and known or, in principle at least, knowable, to
the participants.5 Since he denies that the world economy can be
48. See generally E.J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital, 1848-1875 (1975); E.J.
Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire, 1875-1914 (1987); Eugene D. Genovese, The
Political Economy of Slavery: Studies in the Economy and Society of the Slave South
(1989).
49. See generally Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism
(Talcott Parsons trans., Routledge 2d ed. 1992) (1930).
50. Beitz, supra note 45, at 145.
51. I introduce this caveat for the following reason: although I may not know how
the car insurance or the social security system may work, how insurance premiums are
set and social security benefits disbursed, in principle, I could find out if I choose to.
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understood along these lines, Rawls maintains that principles of
distributive justice cannot be applied to this domain. Whereas in a
system of cooperation there would be clear rules and patterns for
distributing benefits and obligations, the world economy can hardly be
the object of such clear and transparent judgments. Thus global
distributive justice principles, despite their considerable appeal, do
not have "a defined goal, aim, or cut-off point.""2  Rawls is only
partially right in this objection. The world economy, while not being a
pure system of cooperation, also includes organizations such as the
WTO and the IMF, which have very clear rules of cooperation. In
addition, the world economy encompasses a myriad of patterns and
trends generated by the unintended consequences of individual actors.
The world economy, or for that matter any economic system,
possesses features of cooperation as well as the logic of unintended
consequences. Think, for example, of the stock market: While there
are clearly defined rules of cooperation-at least in principle-as to
how stocks can be bought and sold, as to how their values are rated, at
the end of the day what makes the stock market work is precisely "the
logic of unintended consequences." Once these rules of cooperation
are established, no one can predict, and in principle ought not to be
able to predict, what results the market produces. Insider trading is
regulated because it skews the logic of unintended consequences by
destroying the fairness of the rules of cooperation. Unlike free
marketers, I have no faith that the logic of unintended consequences
is always rational or just. Obviously governments and other
regulatory agencies interfere precisely to rectify dysfunctionalities
resulting from the play of market forces. If we concede to Rawls then
that the world economy is not a pure system of cooperation, but a
mixed domain showing features of cooperation and competition,
organization and the logic of unintended consequences, what follows
for the global redistributive position?
The world economy, while falling short of being a perfect system of
cooperation, is one of significant interdependences with non-
negligible distributive consequences for the players involved. Within
this system, there are public and semi-public international bodies and
organizations which have regulatory functions such as the World
Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the Agency for
International Development and treaty associations such GATT and
NAFTA. Increasingly, these organizations are moving toward a
A system of cooperation, as opposed to a system of "unintended consequences," is
based on knowable rules and regulations. Social and economic life, however, is
governed by both kinds of schemes: systems of cooperation as well as the logic of
unintended consequences. The economic market is a social sphere which combines
both features. Some would even argue that it functions as a system of cooperation
precisely because it is based on the logic of unintended consequences.
52. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 2, at 106.
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model of global cooperation, which intends to control and to
ameliorate the havoc that the logic of unintended consequences can
cause. Global justice theorists are right in demanding contra Rawls
that these bodies ought to be rendered increasingly accountable for
their actions and transparent in their decision making to their
constituencies. Even if the world economy is not a system of
cooperation, precisely because it reveals significant patterns of
interdependence, as well as being influenced by quasi-governing
bodies, there is a great deal of room for reforms in this domain which
would go well beyond the natural duty of assistance to burdened
peoples.
The world community, I want to suggest, should be viewed as a
global civil society, in which peoples organized as states are major
players, but by no means the only players. A cosmopolitan
perspective takes its starting point from the Kantian view that if the
actions of one can affect the actions of another,53 then we have an
obligation to regulate our actions under a common law of freedom
which respects our equality as moral agents. The consequences of our
actions generate moral obligations; once we become aware of how our
actions influence the well-being and freedom of others, we must
assume responsibility for the unintended and invisible consequences
of our individual and collective doings. We are constantly discovering
such interdependencies and becoming aware that what we eat, drink,
smoke, consume as energy in our homes, and drive has substantial
impact upon the lives of others to whom we may not even be remotely
related. There is a dialectic here between the growth of social
knowledge and the spread of moral responsibility. In Kantian
language, if the will of one can limit the will of another in the external
domain of actions, then we are intertwined in the moral net of
responsibilities and obligations. Such is the situation with the world
economy: While very clear judgments about the specific effects of this
or that policy upon others' lives and well-being may not always be at
hand, we are permanently challenged by discovering the unintended
consequences of our actions as well as by discovering the regulatory
and interventionist measures of world-governing bodies. Such
knowledge creates moral responsibility. It is no longer morally
permissible for car drivers and industries in Chicago, for example, to
ignore that their actions are causing acid rain in Canada; nor should it
be possible for those living in the U.S. to ignore that the agricultural
abundance of California is owed to, in large measure even if not
wholly, to the sweat, blood and toil of illegal Mexican workers, whose
cheap seasonal labor has made possible the harvest of abundance we
reap.
53. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice 34, 52 (John Ladd
trans., 1965) (1797).
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Beitz and Pogge thus draw the conclusion that a global
redistributive principle must be applicable to the world-economic
system. As Beitz writes: "In particular, if the difference principle
('Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they
are.., to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.') would be
chosen in the domestic original position, it would be chosen in the
global original position as well."54
The debate as to whether the global redistributive principle is best
thought of as a version of a Rawlsian difference principle or as some
form of Pogge's global egalitarian principle is not one that I will
pursue further in this context. For even if we endorse some form of
global redistribution and hope to design institutions which would
avoid the pitfalls of world government while achieving more global
distributive justice, we will not be able to address the normative
dimensions of migratory movements by redistributive measures
alone." In many cases, improved living conditions in poorer regions of
the world encourage rather than discourage migrations.
With reference to the economic causes of migration, for example,
Hania Zlotnik writes:
Given that economic considerations are at the root of most
international migration, the latter is significantly influenced by
developments in the world economy.... The promotion of freer
trade either within trading blocs or at a more general level is
deemed to have important consequences for international
migration.... However, since the process of development itself is
recognized to set in motion forces that promote migration, it is not
evident whether the successful participation of developing countries
in the world economy and the trading system will enhance or reduce
the potential for international migration.56
54. Beitz, supra note 45, at 151; see also Pogge, supra note 4.
55. Although liberal cosmopolitans do not address migration centrally, one can
assume that they see migratory flows as aspects of global redistribution through which
the poor of the earth claim a share of the wealth of richer countries by seeking access
to them. Commenting on Henry Sidgwick's plea for restricting immigration in order
to maintain a society's internal cohesion, Beitz points out:
[U]nder contemporary conditions, it seems unlikely that the value derived
by their citizens from the cohesion and order of relatively well-endowed
societies is greater than the value that could be gained by others from the
redistribution of labor (or wealth) that would be brought about by
adherence to cosmopolitan policies.
Beitz, supra note 45, at 209. Beitz's argument is utilitarian; it aggregates the value
derived by citizens of closed societies and compares it to those of immigrants who
want to enter them. Although the benefits of the flexible movements of peoples
across national borders are considerable, and from the standpoint of the receiving
countries not at all negligible, migratory movements are not about economic interests
alone. I discuss the challenge of decline of citizenship theorists to global
redistributionists in Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and
Citizens (2004).
56. Hania Zlotnik, Past Trends in International Migration and Their Implications
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A post-Westphalian conception of sovereignty will need to address
migration and cross-border movements on their own terms and
without subsuming them under distributive justice. Trans-border
movement rights belong among fundamental human freedoms, and
cannot be made to depend upon the outcome of redistributive
measures.
IV. POST-WESTPHALIAN DEVELOPMENTS AND CROSS-BORDER
JUSTICE
To appreciate why Rawls and global justice theorists significantly
diverge from Kant's understanding of cosmopolitan right in evaluating
cross-border movements, I will briefly turn to Kant himself. This brief
consideration will show that Kant considered the rights of peoples to
engage in cross-border movements to be an individual moral right.
His formulations presciently anticipate the distinctions in
international law between migrants on the one hand, and refuge and
asylum seekers on the other.
Written in 1795, upon the signing of the Treaty of Basel by Prussia
and revolutionary France, Kant's essay on "Perpetual Peace" has
enjoyed considerable revival of attention in recent years.57 What
makes this essay particularly interesting under the current conditions
of political globalization is the visionary depth of Kant's project for
perpetual peace among nations. Kant formulates three definitive
articles for perpetual peace among states. These read: "The Civil
Constitution of Every State should be Republican"; "The Law of
Nations shall be founded on a Federation of Free States"; and "The
Law of World Citizenship Shall be Limited to Conditions of Universal
Hospitality."58 Much scholarship on this essay has focused on the
precise legal and political form that these articles could or would take,
and on whether Kant meant to propose the establishment of a world-
federation of republics or a league of sovereign nation-states.
What remains frequently uncommented upon is the Third Article of
Perpetual Peace, the only one, in fact, which Kant himself explicitly
designates with the terminology of the Weltbuirgerrecht. The German
reads: "Das Weltbiirgerrecht soll auf Bedingungen der allgemeinen
Hospitalitdit eingeschrankt sein."59 Kant himself notes the oddity of the
locution of "hospitality" in this context, and therefore remarks that "it
for Future Prospects, in International Migration into the 21st Century: Essays in
Honor of Reginald Appleyard 227 (M.A.B. Siddique ed., 2001).
57. Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal (James Bohman &
Matthias Lutz-Bachman eds., 1997).
58. Immanuel Kant, Zum Ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf, in
Immanuel Kants Werke 434-46 (A. Buchenau et al. eds., 1923) (1795) [hereinafter
Kant, Zum Ewigen Frieden]; Kant, supra note 41, at 92-105.
59. Kant, Zum Ewigen Frieden, supra note 58, at 443.
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is not a question of philanthropy but of right."6 In other words,
hospitality is not to be understood as a virtue of sociability, as the
kindness and generosity one may show to strangers who come to one's
land or who become dependent upon one's act of kindness through
circumstances of nature or history; hospitality is a right which belongs
to all human beings insofar as we view them as potential participants
in a world republic. The right of hospitality is odd in that it does not
regulate relationships among individuals who are members of a
particular civil entity and under whose jurisdiction they stand; this
right regulates the interactions of individuals who belong to different
civic entities yet who encounter one another at the margins of
bounded communities. The right of hospitality is situated at the
boundaries of the polity; it delimits civic space by regulating relations
among members and strangers. Hence the right of hospitality
occupies that space between human rights and civil rights, between
the right of humanity in our person and the rights that accrue to us
insofar as we are members of specific republics.
Kant writes:
Hospitality (Wirtbarkeit) means the right of a stranger not to be
treated as an enemy when he arrives in the land of another. One
may refuse to receive him when this can be done without causing his
destruction; but, so long as he peacefully occupies his place, one may
not treat him with hostility. It is not the right to be a permanent
visitor (Gastrecht) that one may demand. A special beneficent
agreement (ein ... wohltatiger Vertrag) would be needed in order to
give an outsider a right to become a fellow inhabitant
(Hausgenossen) for a certain length of time. It is only a right of
temporary sojourn (ein Besuchsrecht), a right to associate, which all
men have. They have it by virtue of their common possession (das
Recht des gemeinschaftlichen Besitzes) of the surface of the earth,
where, as a globe, they cannot infinitely disperse and hence must
finally tolerate the presence of each other. 61
Kant distinguishes the "right to be a permanent visitor," which he
calls Gastrecht, from the "temporary right of sojourn."62 The right to
be a permanent visitor is awarded through a freely chosen special
agreement which goes beyond what is owed to the other morally, and
what he is entitled to legally; therefore, Kant names this a "wohltdtiger
Vertrag," a contract of beneficence.63 It is a special privilege which the
republican sovereign can award certain foreigners who abide in their
territories who, perform certain functions, who represent their
respective political entities, and engage in long-term trade, and the
like. The "droit d'aubaine" in pre-revolutionary France, which
60. Kant, supra note 41, at 102.
61. Kant, Zum Ewigen Frieden, supra note 58, at 443; Kant, supra note 41, at 102.
62. Kant, supra note 41, at 102-03.
63. Kant, Zum Ewigen Frieden, supra note 58, at 443; Kant, supra note 41, at 103.
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granted foreigners certain rights of residency, the acquisition of
property, and the practicing of a profession, would be pertinent
historical examples. The special trade concessions which the Ottoman
Empire, China, Japan and India granted Westerners from the
eighteenth century onward would be others. The Jews in pre-modern
Europe, who after their persecution through the Inquisition in Spain
in the fifteenth century, spread to the north, to Holland, Britain,
Germany and other territories, would be another major group to
whose status both the right of hospitality and that of permanent
visitorship would apply.
The right of hospitality entails a claim to temporary residency that
cannot be refused, if such refusal would involve the destruction-
Kant's word here is "Untergang"-of the other. To refuse sojourn to
victims of religious wars, to victims of piracy or ship-wreckage, when
such refusal would lead to their demise, is untenable, Kant writes.
What is unclear in Kant's discussion is whether such relations among
peoples and nations involve acts of supererogation, going beyond the
call of moral duty, or whether they entail a certain sort of moral claim
concerning the recognition of "the rights of humanity in the person of
the other."'
We may see here the juridical and moral ambivalence which affects
discussions of the right of asylum and refuge to this day. Are the
rights of asylum and refuge, rights in the sense of being reciprocal
moral obligations which, in some sense or another, are grounded upon
our mutual humanity? Or are these right claims in the legal sense of
being enforceable norms of behavior which individuals and groups can
hold each other to and, in particular, force sovereign nation-states to
comply with? Kant's construction provides no clear answer. The
right of hospitality entails a moral claim with potential legal
consequences in that the obligation of the receiving states to grant
temporary residency to foreigners is anchored in a republican
cosmopolitical order. Such an order does not have a supreme
executive law governing it. In this sense the obligation to show
hospitality to foreigners and strangers cannot be enforced; it remains a
voluntarily incurred obligation of the political sovereign. The right of
hospitality expresses all the dilemmas of a republican cosmopolitan
order in a nutshell: how to create quasi-legally binding obligations
through voluntary commitments and in the absence of an
overwhelming sovereign power with the ultimate right of
enforcement?
No matter how unsatisfactory some of his formulations may have
been, Kant's claim that first entry cannot be denied to those who seek
it if this would result in their "destruction" (Untergang) has become
incorporated into the Geneva Convention of 1951 on the Status of
64. Kant, supra note 53, at 46 (translation altered).
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Refugees and its Protocol of 1967, as the principle of "non-
refoulement." This principle obliges signatory states not to forcibly
return refugees and asylum seekers to their countries of origin if doing
so would pose a clear danger to their lives and freedom. Of course,
just as sovereign states can manipulate the meaning of the terms of
this article to define life and freedom more or less narrowly as it befits
their purposes, it is also possible to circumvent the "non-refoulement"
clause by depositing refugees and asylees in so-called "safe third
countries."
Kant clearly foresaw and justified such balancing acts between the
moral obligations of states to those who seek refuge in their midst and
to their own welfare and interests. The lexical ordering of the two
claims-the moral needs of others versus legitimate self-interest-is
vague, except in the most obvious cases when the life and limb of
refugees would be endangered by denying them the right of entry;
apart from such cases, however, the obligation to respect the liberty
and welfare of the guest can permit a narrow interpretation on the
part of the sovereign to whom it is addressed, and need not be
considered an unconditional duty.
The universal right to hospitality, which is due to every human
person, imposes upon us an imperfect moral duty to help and offer
shelter to those whose life, limb, and well-being are endangered. This
duty is "imperfect," i.e., conditional, in that it can permit exceptions,
and can be overridden by legitimate grounds of self-preservation.
There is no obligation to shelter the other when doing so would
endanger one's own life and limb. It is disputed in moral philosophy
as to how widely or narrowly the obligation to the other should be
interpreted,6" and it is equally controversial how we should understand
legitimate grounds of self-preservation: Is it morally permissible to
turn the needy away because they dilute our cultural mores? Does
the preservation of culture constitute a legitimate basis of self-
preservation?
Kant's Perpetual Peace essay signaled a watershed between two
conceptions of sovereignty and paved the way for the transition from
the first to the second. We can name these "Westphalian sovereignty"
65. Compare Henry Sidgwick:
[B]ut those who are in distress or urgent need have a claim on us for special
kindness. These are generally recognised claims: but we find considerable
difficulty and divergence, when we attempt to determine more precisely
their extent and relative obligation: and the divergence becomes indefinitely
greater when we compare the customs and common opinions now existing
among ourselves in respect of such claims, with those of other ages and
countries.
Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics 246 (7th ed. 1962) (1874). For some recent
treatments, see Onora O'Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account
of Practical Reasoning (1996); Samuel Sheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances:
Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought (2001).
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and "liberal international sovereignty."66 In the classical Westphalian
regime of sovereignty, states are free and equal; they enjoy ultimate
authority over all objects and subjects within a circumscribed
territory; relations with other sovereigns are voluntary and contingent
and limited in kind and scope to transitory military and economic
alliances as well as cultural and religious affinities; above all, states
"regard cross-border processes as a 'private matter' concerning only
those immediately affected."67
By contrast, in conceptions of liberal international sovereignty, the
formal equality of states is increasingly dependent upon their
subscribing to common values and principles such as the observance
of human rights and the rule of law and respect for democratic self-
determination. Sovereignty no longer means ultimate and arbitrary
authority; states who treat their citizens in violation of certain norms,
who close borders, prevent freedoms of market, speech and
association and the like are thought not to belong within a specific
society of states or alliances; the anchoring of domestic principles and
institutions in principles shared with others like oneself becomes
crucial.
Certainly in The Law of Peoples, Rawls followed Kant's legacy
insofar as he too made recognition of the sovereignty of peoples
conditional upon their subscription to respect for human rights and
non-belligerence. The more robust Kantian vision of cosmopolitan
justice which regards individuals as moral agents in the international
arena to whom states owe obligations of justice, and in the first place
the obligation to respect cross-border movements, is absent from
Rawls's vision. Even from within the confines of the historical
limitations of his day, Kant envisaged a dynamic, expanding and
necessarily interdependent world society. Rawls's vision of the
"Society of Peoples," by contrast, is not inspired by the dynamism of
commerce and curiosity, by exploration and the search for liberty;
rather, it is the quest for order and stability that motivates it.
Kantian liberalism stands at the threshold of a modern world
expanding globally, while Rawls's vision, for fully understandable
reasons, is governed by the memories of two World Wars, the
Holocaust and the Cold War, which had barely ended when The Law
of Peoples was written. To imagine new principles for a post-
Westphalian order, of which the Rawlsian The Law of Peoples is
surely one of the first testimonies, we will need to recover some of the
radicalism of Kantian cosmopolitan justice.
The phenomena of migration, along with the predicament of asylum
seekers and refugees in the contemporary world, touch some of the
66. See Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy 20 (1999); David
Held, Law of States, Law of Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty, 8 Legal Theory 1,
5 (2002).
67. Held, supra note 66, at 4.
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deepest sources of interests and passions in liberal democratic
societies. While universalists and cosmopolitans judge the closed door
policy of the wealthy nations of Europe and North America to be a
form of organized hypocrisy which will not bear philosophical
scrutiny, decline of citizenship theorists point to values such as the
rule of law, a vibrant civic culture and active citizenship, which are
equally important to such societies and which they consider
threatened by world-wide migrations. To sort out these contemporary
debates is beyond the scope of this Essay.
In conclusion, let me only outline the constituents of a theory of just
membership: recognizing the moral claim of refugees and asylees to
first admittance; a regime of porous borders for immigrants; an
injunction against denationalization and the loss of citizenship rights,
and the vindication of the right of every human being "to have rights,"
that is, to belong to some human community. The right to have rights
entails a defense of the universal status of personality-i.e., of being a
legal right bearer-for each and every human being. The status of
alienage ought not to denude one of fundamental rights.
Furthermore, just membership also defends the claim to citizenship on
the part of the alien when and if she has fulfilled certain conditions.
Permanent alienage is not only incompatible with a liberal democratic
understanding of human community, it is also a violation of human
rights. This claim to membership must be accommodated by practices
that are non-discriminatory in scope, transparent in formulation and
execution, and justiciable when violated by states. The doctrine of
state sovereignty, which has so far shielded naturalization, citizenship
and denationalization decisions from scrutiny by international as well
as constitutional courts, must be challenged on these grounds as well
as others.68
68. See Benhabib, supra note 55.
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